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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TEACHING INDIAN LAW

LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON*
INTRODUCTION
Federal Indian Law is among the most comprehensive courses in the law
school curriculum, typically covering issues in criminal law, property law,
contracts, constitutional law, international law, and civil jurisdiction, all in a
context of a complex history of inter-governmental relations played out against
a backdrop of often profound cultural difference. The course invariably calls
upon faculty and students to wrestle with troubling questions, the answers to
which are not always clear.
It is also a field that is growing. When I first started teaching Federal
Indian Law twenty years ago, the Association of American Law Schools
Faculty Handbook listed fifty-nine professors at forty-five schools who selfidentified as teaching Native American Law.1 This number was supplemented
by an unknown number of adjuncts, including myself. This year, the
Handbook lists 127 full-time faculty at eighty-five schools self-identifying as
teachers of Native American Law.2 Some suggest that the increase is due in
part to a perception that, as a result of gaming, tribes have more money to
spend on lawyers.3I think a better explanation is that, as a result of several
decades of relatively greater federal legislative support for tribal governments,
tribes have been more visible, and law students—and faculty—have felt it
advantageous to learn something about them. This is certainly the case at the

* Faculty Director, American Indian Law and Policy Center, Associate Director, Inter-American
Center for Law and Culture, Judge Haskell A. Holloman Professor of Law, and Sam K. Viersen
Presidential Professor at The University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS, AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS
1990–1991, at 1068 (1990).
2. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS, AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS
2009–2010, at 1725–26 (2009).
3. See, e.g., Tanya Kowalski, The Forgotten Sovereigns, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 765, 788
(2009) (noting the “increasing call” for law schools to “increas[e] students’ exposure to federal
Indian law topics” based, in part, on the fact that “students increasingly are encountering federal
Indian and tribal law issues in practice”); Gabriel S. Galanda, A Need to Know Indian Law, OR.
ST. B. 62, 62 (Nov. 2003) (noting that tribes are “becom[ing] an influential economic, legal and
political force” due in part to their gaming revenues), available at http://www.osbar.org/
publications/bulletin/03nov/parting.html.
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University of Oklahoma College of Law, where most of my students expect to
deal with or work for tribes in practice and want to know the rules.
Given the large number of faculty who have no experience with Federal
Indian Law, either as teachers, students, or practitioners, I will begin with
some basics. After that, I will offer my thoughts on the aspects of the course I
have found most challenging during my years teaching it. I suspect these
observations will resonate with my colleagues who have been teaching in the
field for a while. I hope that they will make the road easier for those inclined
to follow.
There are three Federal Indian Law casebooks currently on the market.
The oldest of these, American Indian Law: Native Nations and the Federal
System4 (“Clinton”), was first authored by Monroe Price in 1973 and is now
co-authored by Robert N. Clinton, Carole E. Goldberg, and Rebecca Tsosie.5
At 1286 pages, it is also the longest. Clinton is published by LexisNexis. The
second, Cases and Materials on Federal Indian Law6 (“Getches”), first coauthored by David H. Getches, Charles F. Wilkinson, and Daniel Rosenfelt in
1979 and since 1993 co-authored by Professors Getches, Wilkinson, and
Robert A. Williams, Jr., is published by Thomson-West.7 It runs 1030 pages.
For thirty years, Clinton and Getches were the only two casebooks on the
market. In 2008, Thomson-West introduced a third casebook, American
Indian Law: Cases and Commentary 8 (“Anderson”), co-authored by
Professors Robert T. Anderson, Bethany Berger, Phillip P. Frickey, and Sarah
Krakoff. It is the shortest of the casebooks at 951 pages (plus an appendix
containing the text of the U.S. Constitution).
All of these casebooks are organized roughly the same way. Each begins
with an introduction and a chapter on history. In Clinton, the history section
runs about 100 pages, just under one-tenth of the total text. In Getches, it is
longer: about 210 pages, or one-fifth of the text. Anderson’s history section
runs about 150 pages, or one-sixth of the text. Each casebook includes
materials on Comparative and International Indigenous Peoples Law. In
Clinton, these materials follow the history section and comprise about fifteen
pages. Getches and Anderson position these materials at the end of their
casebooks, Getches devoting about eighty pages to the topics, Anderson about
fifty pages. The remainder of the casebooks—the materials addressing the

4. ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM (5th ed. 2007).
5. Id. at xv.
6. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (5th ed.
2004).
7. Id. at v–vi.
8. ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY (2d
ed. 2010).
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substantive U.S. and tribal law—focuses primarily on rights and jurisdiction
issues. Clinton’s chapter titles are as follows: “Recurring Issues in TribalFederal Legal Relations” (including definitional questions such as “Who is an
Indian?,” Equal Protection, and the canons of construction for interpreting the
tribal-federal legal relationship (e.g., treaty construction)); “Tribal Sovereignty
and its Exercise;” “Federal & State Claims to Legal Authority in Indian
Country;” “Jurisdiction under Special Statutes;” “Tribal Rights to Land &
Cultural Resources;” and “The Operation of the Reserved Rights Doctrine:
Hunting, Fishing, and Water Rights.” Getches begins with “The FederalTribal Relationship” (including tribal property rights), then moves to “Tribal
Sovereignty and the Administration of Justice in Indian Country;” “Tribal
Sovereignty and Jurisdiction: Congressional and Judicial Recognition and
Limitations;” “Tribal and State Conflicts over Civil Regulatory and
Adjudicatory Jurisdiction;” “Reservation Economic Development;” “Indian
Religion and Culture;” “Water Rights;” “Fishing and Hunting Rights;” and
“Rights of Alaska Natives and Native Hawaiians.” Anderson’s chapters are:
“Federal Power in Indian Affairs: Scope, Sources and Limitations;” “Tribes,
Indian Country and Criminal Jurisdiction;” “Tribal Sovereignty;” “State-Tribal
Struggles Over Jurisdiction;” “Tribal Jurisdiction Over Non-Members;”
“Natural Resources, Hunting, Fishing and Gathering Rights;” “Water Rights;”
“American Indian Religion and Culture;” and “Alaska and Hawai’i.”
In part because of its lengthier treatment of the history of Federal Indian
policy, about which most students know little before beginning the class, I
have taught mostly from Getches. In a three-hour lecture course, I will assign
all of the casebook chapters except “Indian Religion and Culture,” “Water
Rights,” “Fishing and Hunting Rights,” and “Rights of Alaska Natives and
Native Hawaiians.” I introduce these materials elsewhere in the course. Water
rights, for example, can be covered in brief in conjunction with the reserved
rights doctrine. I introduce fishing and hunting rights with the canons of treaty
construction.
Because the casebooks necessarily provide information on a wide variety
of subject areas, I find my students invariably want to know more about
particular topics. At the University of Oklahoma, we handle this by regularly
offering supplemental courses in Native American Natural Resources Law,
Tribal Courts and Tribal Law, Indian Water Law, and Comparative and
International Indigenous Peoples Law. Starting in Fall 2010, we plan to add
courses in Indian Gaming Law and Indian Cultural and Religious Rights. With
the exception of Native American Natural Resources Law, which uses a fine
casebook co-authored by Professors Judith Royster and Michael Blumm,9 each

9. JUDITH V. ROYSTER & MICHAEL C. BLUMM, NATIVE AMERICAN NATURAL RESOURCE
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2007).
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of our current courses relies on materials prepared by the instructor.10 Guest
speakers are readily available in Oklahoma, and all of the faculty involved in
teaching these courses include visiting lecturers in their classes. Many take
their students on field trips.
If the course is offered to introduce a little-known area of the law and there
is no perceived need to cover extensive amounts of material, Federal Indian
Law is a perfect class—especially for those who like active student
participation. The materials themselves are so inherently interesting that
generating discussion in class is easy. For those who want to cover more (as
we do at Oklahoma), the challenge is reining in student discussion to keep the
class on schedule.
During my twenty years of teaching Federal Indian Law, I have come to
believe the following to be among the chief components in a successful class,
by which I mean one that communicates information and stretches students’
minds. This list is of course my own and no doubt my colleagues would have
their own lists. These are admonitions I offer to myself at the start of every
semester.
I. TEACH THE HISTORY
It is very easy in teaching Indian Law, especially to non-Indian students, to
play to majoritarian guilt. Native peoples have been treated badly from the
beginning of our colonial history. Most students, in my experience, will come
in believing this. Others, however, will come into the class believing that this
history has been exaggerated. One of my jobs as an Indian Law teacher, I
believe, is to present the historic record and allow it to speak for itself. And
trust me, it will. I have never had to express an opinion on the treatment of
Native Peoples in any Indian law class I have taught. It has not been
necessary. To teach the history properly, I recommend reading widely. All of
the Indian Law casebooks mentioned above contain historical materials, and
most are very good. That said, U.S.–tribal relations is a large field, and there is
new information coming out every day. Joining a good history listserv is a
useful way to keep up with the literature. Several university presses, including
our own, specialize in Native American topics, and I am sure they would all be
happy to add you to their mailing list. For those interested in learning more
about the background of individual major cases, see Indian Law Stories
(Phillip P. Frickey, Carole Goldberg, & Kevin Washburn, eds., forthcoming
2010).

10. For our future courses, I should note that Carolina Academic Press publishes the text.
KATHRYN R.L. RAND & STEVEN ANDREW LIGHT, INDIAN GAMING LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS (2008). For those interested in offering a course in the international human rights
dimension of indigenous peoples law, Aspen publishes a text by S. James Anaya. S. JAMES
ANAYA, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (2009).
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II. DIVORCE RIGHTS FROM CULTURE
Some years ago I noticed a paradox in the caselaw: the more economically
successful tribes were and the more they resembled the non-Indian
communities that surrounded them, the more likely it was that the Supreme
Court would deny them jurisdictional rights. One example will suffice.
Brendale and Wilkinson were non-tribal landowners on the Yakima
Reservation in Washington State.11 When they petitioned the tribe for
permission to build cabins on their lands, they were turned down.12 Both went
to Yakima County to gain county approval over the tribe’s objection that the
county lacked jurisdiction to zone reservation lands.13 With no majority for an
opinion on either claim, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Wilkinson and
against Brendale.14 The rationale expressed in the swing opinion, authored by
Justice Stevens, is telling and illustrates my point. Brendale’s land, he wrote,
was in a part of the reservation that had retained its traditional tribal
“character”—it was “an undeveloped refuge of cultural and religious
significance, a place where tribal members ‘may camp, hunt, fish, and gather
roots and berries in the tradition of their culture.’”15 Wilkinson’s land, in
contrast, lay in an “integrated [and developed] community that is not
economically or culturally delimited by reservation boundaries.”16 The
underlying message seems to be that if land looks “Indian,” as the majority
culture conceives it, it is Indian; if it does not, it is not. I began to think of this
as the Cherokee paradox. The Cherokee Nation enjoyed an independent
existence in the mountains of Georgia, North Carolina, and Tennessee until
they adopted a Southern agricultural economy and constitution.17 In response,
Georgia passed a law imposing its code on the Nation and abolishing Cherokee
national institutions.18 The Cherokee Nation sued Georgia in the Supreme
Court, and the Court decided it lacked original jurisdiction.19 The Cherokee
were not a “foreign state” under Article III.20 Instead, according to Chief
Justice John Marshall, they were a “domestic dependent nations.”21 The

11. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408,
417–18 (1989).
12. Id. at 417–19.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 432–33.
15. Id. at 441.
16. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 444.
17. Mary Young, The Cherokee Nation: Mirror of the Republic, 33 AM. Q. 502, 506–07
(1981).
18. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 7 (1831).
19. Id. at 15–16, 20.
20. Id. at 20.
21. Id. at 17.
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following term in Worcester v. Georgia,22 the Court held imposition of
Georgia’s laws invalid.
I began to suspect after reading these cases that to some on the Court—and
I think to many in the majority society—tribal “nationhood” depended on
“dependence” and adherence to cultural stereotype. The reality is that tribes
can be successful, integrate into the national economy, and still retain their
political sovereignty. I think this is a point worth fleshing out in class.
III. DIVORCE POLITICAL STATUS FROM ETHNICITY
In Oklahoma (and I am sure elsewhere), everyone has heard someone say
“you don’t look Indian.” This comes from a sense that “Indian” is an ethnic or
racial designation. And while that is certainly true, it is not the whole truth for
purposes of Federal Indian Law. The key case is Morton v. Mancari.23
Several employees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in Albuquerque protested
that they had been passed over for promotion because they were non-Indian.24
Their attorneys argued that the Bureau’s promotional and hiring preference for
tribal members constituted racial discrimination under the Fifth Amendment
and could only survive if it satisfied the requirements of strict scrutiny
review.25 The Supreme Court held that the classification was not race-based,
but political—what disadvantaged the plaintiffs was not their race, but their
lack of a tribal membership card—and subjected the preference to rational
basis review, which it easily satisfied.26 The identification of tribes as political
and not racial groups is essential to a proper understanding of tribal
sovereignty. The issue is complicated, however, by the decision of most tribes
to require a certain descent or blood quantum as a condition of citizenship. To
many tribes, this is understandably seen as necessary to the preservation of
group identity and culture. But the fact that tribes have made this decision
does not mean that it is required. Indeed, some tribes have allowed nonIndians citizenship rights. The Cherokee Nation, for example, historically
allowed spouses of citizens to become citizens themselves,27 and the Five
Nations in Eastern Oklahoma all historically allowed citizenship rights to be
enjoyed by descendants of former slaves.28 Understanding that there is

22. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
23. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
24. Id. at 539.
25. Id. at 551.
26. Id. at 553–54.
27. Curtis Act, 30 Stat. 495, 502 (1898).
28. See generally DAWES COMMISSION, THE FINAL ROLLS OF CITIZENS AND FREEDMEN OF
THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES IN INDIAN TERRITORY (1907) (listing the citizens of the Five
Civilized Tribes (i.e., Five Nations) from 1898–1907 and dividing them into categories, including
“Citizens by Marriage” and freed slaves). See also Donald A. Grinde, Jr. & Quintard Taylor, Red
vs Black: Conflict and Accommodation in the Post Civil War Indian Territory, 1865–1907, 8 AM.
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flexibility in citizenship reduces the Equal Protection anxiety many students
(and faculty) may feel when exploring tribal rights issues. Students are more
comfortable with separate rights for other nations than they are with separate
rights for subnational racial groups. The fact of this flexibility helps us better
understand the basis for tribal claims to national sovereign status.
IV. TEACH THE RESERVED RIGHTS DOCTRINE
Students, even (and sometimes especially) students well disposed to
acknowledge tribal rights, often come to class convinced that the United States
“gave” things to the tribes: for example, that the United States “gave” the
tribes their reservations. In fact, in the majority of instances, the tribes ceded
lands to the United States and reserved what they did not cede.29 This is
important in defining rights. Under the reserved rights doctrine,30 what is not
ceded is retained. Thus, if a treaty is silent concerning the conveyance of a
right and the tribe is doing the ceding, the right is retained by the tribe. If the
United States is ceding to the tribe, the reverse presumption arguably prevails.
A little rethinking here goes a long way to help students understand the current
rights configuration.
V. TEACH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT—AND RECOGNIZE IT AS A POLITICAL
ISSUE
This is what many clients need advice on and what interests some students
most. It is also a source—perhaps the biggest source—of non-Indian angst. I
have lost track of the number of times I have been asked at public events
“what’s with all these tribal smokeshops selling untaxed tobacco?” You and
your students should have an answer. In my experience, students readily grasp
the point of smokeshops by walking through the mechanics of tribal economic
development options. First, as a consequence of Supreme Court case law and
federal legislation (Johnson v. M’Intosh31 and the Trade and Intercourse Act32),
tribes cannot mortgage their lands. This makes accumulating cash for any sort
of economic development project problematic. One solution was to take
advantage of an arguable exemption from state sales and excise taxes and sell
products produced elsewhere tax-free through tribally owned or licensed
stores. Because of the remote locations of much of Indian Country, the tax

INDIAN Q. 221 (1984) (providing overview of racial relations, intermarriage, and citizenship in
Oklahoma).
29. See, e.g., STATE OF OREGON LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE SERVICES, BACKGROUND BRIEF
ON INDIAN TRIBES 2 (May 2004), available at http://www.leg.state.or.us/comm/commsrvs/
background_briefs2008/briefs/GeneralGovernment/OregonIndianTribes.pdf.
30. For an overview of the reserved rights doctrine, see Judith V. Royster, A Primer on
Indian Water Rights: More Questions than Answers, 30 TULSA L.J. 61 (1994).
31. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
32. 4 Stat. 729 (1834) (relevant part currently encoded at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2006)).
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exemption had to be sizeable to lure customers. For this reason, the most
viable products were those the use of which the states were attempting to
discourage via the imposition of sin taxes. These turned out to be tobacco and
motor fuels. Enter the smokeshop. Indian gaming is another industry born of
tribal immunity from state regulation. The Supreme Court held in 1987 that
tribes could offer high-stakes bingo and other games—effectively free of state
regulation.33 In 1988, Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
limiting that freedom.34 Under the Act, if tribes want to operate facilities
offering, for example, slot machines, they are directed to enter into a compact
with the surrounding state.35 A new federal regulatory body—the National
Indian Gaming Commission—was created to ensure compliance with federal
law and was funded by tribal gaming proceeds.36 This aspect of tribal
gaming—the extent of regulation—is one students often do not understand
coming into the course. Rules explication in the economic development area
can diminish the concerns of some students that current law unfairly advances
Indian interests in violation of Equal Protection.
VI. CONFRONT THE TENSION BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RIGHTS
Many students—especially those who enter the course thinking it primarily
a civil rights course—will imagine that, just as in most civil rights courses, the
rights of individual Indians will occupy center stage. They are wrong. Not
only do individual rights occupy but a small portion of the typical Indian Law
course, at many important junctures they conflict with the collective rights of
tribes—and lose. For example, The Indian Child Welfare Act,37 passed in
1978 to stem the flow of Indian children being removed from Indian families
and placed with non-Indian adoptive parents, allows the child’s tribe a
powerful and often decisive role in the placement process, even where the
views of the tribe and the biological parents conflict. This creates a tension
that should be addressed.
VII. TEACH THE COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS
Each of the major Indian Law casebooks includes materials on
international and comparative indigenous peoples law. These materials are
important. For one thing, the field is rapidly internationalizing. In September
2007, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the U.N. Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,38 the first comprehensive international

33. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 221–22 (1987).
34. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–21 (2006).
35. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
36. Id. §§ 2702(3), 2704(a), 2717(a)(1).
37. Id. §§ 1901–1963.
38. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007).
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statement on the collective rights of indigenous peoples.39 For another,
understanding that the United States is not alone in sorting out how to relate to
indigenous peoples (and vice versa), and understanding how others have fared,
is important in assessing our successes and failures.
I began teaching a comparative and international indigenous peoples law
course at Oklahoma in 2000. I invited my friend, Brad Morse from the
University of Ottawa, to assemble a class and join my students and me in a
semester-long video conference exploring indigenous peoples issues in our
respective countries. The class was a great hit with students, word spread, and
it soon included students and faculty from eight participating universities: two
in Canada, two in Australia, three in Aotearoa/New Zealand, and Oklahoma.40
Last year, we demonstrated the class for the International Association of Law
Schools Annual Meeting in Shanghai. I do not know if it is true, but we were
told we were likely the first international law school class in the world. I
mention our experience to underscore how doable teaching comparative
indigenous peoples law can be. It does not matter if you know much yourself,
as long as your school is willing to invest in distance education, the costs for
which seem continually to decline.41
CONCLUSION
As I mentioned above, I hope this brief personal overview will prove
useful to my colleagues at other law schools considering teaching a course in
Federal Indian Law. I should in fairness confess a larger aim. It seems trite to
observe that education on complex issues facilitates constructive conversation,
but in my experience the huge lack of understanding on the part of those with
no exposure to Native American Law issues actually renders the observation
meaningful in context. If you should decide to try the class, I’m sure all of us
who teach it now will be grateful for your help.

39. Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Declaration on Rights of
Indigenous Peoples; ‘Major Step Forward’ Towards Human Rights For All, Says President, U.N.
Doc. GA/10612 (Sept. 13, 2007).
40. Participating faculty have included Professors Melissa Castan and David Yarrow
(Monash University), Professor Catherine Iorns (Victoria University), Professor Margaret
Stephenson (University of Queensland), Professors Paul Chartrand and Ruth Thompson
(University of Saskatchewan), Professors Nin Tomas and Khylee Quince (University of
Auckland), and Professor Robert Joseph (Waikato University). Professor Morse is now Dean of
the University Waikato School of Law.
41. For discussion of the technological and pedagogical issues involved, see Margaret
Stephenson, Bradford Morse, Lindsay G. Robertson, Melissa Castan, David Yarrow & Ruth
Thompson, International and Comparative Indigenous Rights Via Videoconferencing, 19 LEGAL
EDUC. REV. 237 (2009).
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